Malevolent Matrix: Forging a Coherent National Biodefense Strategy
Mission Functionality and Four Calibrated Approaches to Scenario Readiness to Address a Shifting Biodefense International Threat Environment
Abstract
The Biodefense Posture Review (BPR) released by the Biden White House in August 2023 offers a comprehensive look at the biothreat landscape. While it acknowledges the increasing threat from advanced biosciences and biotechnology, the BPR falls short in providing a clear strategic framework to address challenges posed by life sciences research and genetic engineering post-2020. The report emphasizes the need to manage risks from biological incidents, be it accidental, natural, or deliberate, but fails to provide clarity on many operational aspects.
There's a pressing need to define terms like biodefense, biothreat, and bioincident doctrinally. Furthermore, the BPR's ambition to provide an operational framework for early warning, preparedness, and response is riddled with potential pitfalls. The challenge is multifaceted, as it not only involves safeguarding the military and the nation but also extends to protecting urban areas, infrastructures, and societal institutions. This necessitates collaboration across various sectors, from public health to synthetic biology.
The BPR does not adequately address the changing nature of biothreats, particularly with the rise of synthetic and CRISPR biotechnologies. The world has entered an era where these technologies are easily accessible, posing potential threats from entities with enough bioscience knowledge. The report also underlines weaknesses in the traditional biothreat domain, as evidenced by the Amerithrax case.
The BPR's emphasis on reforms is commendable, but there's a significant disconnect between intelligence and biosurveillance communities. The COVID crisis highlighted this gap, showing the inadequacies in our threat detection and diagnostic capabilities. To build an effective biodefense system, there's a need to establish a strong foundational structure that addresses threat characterization, surveillance, disease analysis, and response strategies. The BPR should focus on creating a system responsive to various threat scenarios, from lab accidents to deliberate bioattacks.
In conclusion, for a robust biodefense system, it's imperative to consider synthetic biology, toxins, zoonotic risks, and chimera pathogens. Without a state-of-the-art threat characterization and diagnostic capability, the world remains vulnerable to future pandemics. The BPR must tackle the challenges illustrated in the proposed matrix to ensure that the U.S. is adequately prepared for future biothreats.
